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INTRODUCTION
Rampant fraud' (mostly by sellers) is being committed on eBay,
the most successful online auction house and marketplace. Online
auction fraud is growing like a festering cancer because much of the
fraud goes undetected, unreported, or unprosecuted. Moreover,
even when credible evidence of fraud becomes available to eBay or
the law enforcement community, little (if any) action is taken to rem-
edy the problem. Therefore, to establish the Internet as a truly viable
and stable commercial community, minimum guidelines and regula-
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tions must be established to instill broad consumer confidence in
highly successful businesses like eBay.'
The most efficient and effective enforcement regime may be state
regulation for some Internet commerce; however, such state regula-
tion, if not framed within the proper scope, may run afoul of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Therefore, this paper will emphasize
2 See Michael Cooper, Beanie Baby Scams and Identity Thefts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at G19
("The world's flea markets, souks and bazaars have always been magnets for the criminally
minded, from mountebanks and snake-oil salesmen to plain old-fashioned pickpockets.").
Thus, it is no surprise that Internet commerce "has drawn its share of crooks." Id.
3 See generally Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (sustaining a
Commerce Clause challenge to a surcharge applied only to out-of-state solid waste bound for
Oregon); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (discussing the Court's
history of invalidating statutes containing inconsistent regulations under the Commerce
Clause); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a Maine statute banning baitfish im-
portation, because its local benefit outweighed Commerce Clause concerns); Northeast Ban-
corp v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (asserting that Congress may overrule the
Commerce Clause by authorizing state statutes); S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 91 (1984) (striking down a statute requiring primary in-state manufacture of timber
prior to exportation under the Commerce Clause); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458
U.S. 941, 960 (1982) (holding that reciprocity requirement imposed before water can be trans-
ferred out of state violated the Commerce Clause); New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455
U.S. 331, 341 (1982) (stating that the burdens New Hampshire placed on the interstate sale of
hydroelectric power ran afoul of the Commerce Clause); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662, 678 (1981) (finding that an Iowa ban on 65-foot double trailer trucks impermissi-
bly burdened interstate commerce); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
(summarizing the general rule for weighing Commerce Clause challenges); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959) (finding that Illinois mudguard laws were so extreme as
to violate the Commerce Clause, despite safety interests); Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408 (1946) (stating that a Congressional law authorizing a tax on foreign insurance companies
was not in violation of the Commerce Clause); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)
(declaring statutory penalties on out-of-state railroad companies to be unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 412 (1910)
(holding that a telegraph statute merely reflected the duties of a public service corporation,
thereby making is permissible under the Commerce Clause); N.Y. State Dairy Foods, Inc. v.
Northeast Dairy Compact Comm'n, 198 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgement
in favor of the commission because a statute barred only one kind of payment, failing to harm
commerce); ACLU v. Johnson 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing the relationship
between the internet and interstate commerce as defined by the Commerce Clause); Zeran v.
Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998) (acknowledging the
strong relationship between state statute and liability for those involved in Internet commerce);
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (exploring secondary
liability of Internet providers for engaging in illegal commerce); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding in favor of an Internet provider sued over a defamatory state-
ment posted on Matt Drudge's personal website); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (asserting that the Internet was analogous to highways and railroads as an
aspect of interstate commerce); Gentry v. eBay, Inc. 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 715 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (involving a sports memorabilia statute and the contention that an Internet merchant was
in violation thereof for failing to comply with California requirements).
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the need for regulatory oversight and law enforcement, either on the
state or federal level (or both).
Cyber-fraud is a serious problem because it hinders online con-
sumer confidence, and nowhere is the need for consumer confidence
more important than within the online auction community.4 In that
community, one major player, eBay,5 controlling 85% of the market,6
has arisen to serve as the standard for both the online auction com-
munity and Internet commerce (unlike Amazon, eBay consistently
turns a profit).7 However, eBay is neither a model corporate citizen
nor is it concerned with establishing consumer protections that may
result in lower profits.
I. LAw ENFORCEMENT, RESOURCES, ANDJURISDICTION
Internet auction fraud will remain a scourge until intrastate, inter-
state, and international agreements encourage law enforcement
communities to aggressively crack down on all types of e-commerce
fraud. Most legal entities consider the Internet to be "borderless,"
therefore, determining jurisdiction over many auction fraud cases
4 Most Internet fraud involves online auctions and, overall, Internet fraud accounted for
over $4,300,000 in consumer losses from January-October 2001. National Consumers League
Internet Fraud Watch, 2001 Internet Fraud Statistics, at http://www.fraud.org/internet/
2001statsl0mnt.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2003). This number is probably grossly understated
because many consumers either do not know of or do not report fraud incidents. See Evan I.
Schwartz, At Online Auctions, Good, and Raw, Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at G9.
http://www.ebay.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2003). Additionally, for an explanation of the
difference between auction types (English, Dutch, reverse, and sealed-bid), see Sally McGrane,
The Bidding Can Be More than Price, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at H46.
6 Jon Swartz, Fighting Back, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2002, at 3B. See also Lisa Guernsey, The
Powers Behind the Auctions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2000, § 3, at 1 (reporting that, at the time, eBay
controled 90% of the online auction market, based on gross sales). Additionally, because of
eBay's market superiority/monopoly regarding online auctions, I use it as the example of what
is wrong with the system. Smaller players such as Amazon and Yahoo must follow suit, adopting
similar low-cost/low security measures to remain competitive.
, In January 2003, eBay reported record revenues of $413.9 million (with a resulting $87.0
million net income) for its most recent quarter. Press Release, eBay Inc., eBay Inc. Announces
Fourth Quarter and Year End 2002 Financial Results (Jan. 16, 2003), at
http://www.shareholder.com/ebay/news/20030116-99663.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
Additionally, during the last quarter of 2002, eBay hosted a record 195 million listings, con-
firmed registered users totaling 61.7 million and of those registered users, 27.7 million bid,
bought, or listed goods on eBay over the trailing twelve months.
8 See Global Naps, Inc. v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 226 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 n.7 (D. Mass.
2002); Verizon Online Serv., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 613 (E.D. Va. 2002). But see
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that
cyberspace is without borders).
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can be "a nightmare,"9 especially for those cases of fraud involving
relatively small amounts of money."° Furthermore, local and federal
law enforcement agencies are reluctant to spend thousands of budget
dollars on investigating and prosecuting fraud valued at a few hun-
dred, or even a few thousand dollars." Many of the Internet auction
fraud cases that are reported to various state and federal agencies
"are not pursued vigorously because the investigative costs far out-
weigh the victims' financial losses."12
The fraud problem is exacerbated because eBay's goal, according
to their lawyers, is to have limited oversight.' 3 As a result of this pur-
posefully limited oversight by eBay, governmental regulators, and law
enforcement, fraud is rampant14 and either goes virtually unchecked
or is under-policed on many levels, including: shill bidding, 5 non-
9 See Millennium Enter., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 923 (D. Or.
1999).
10 Melissa Kossler, Fraud a Problem as Online Commerce Grows, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 20,
2002, at 4E.
1 Id. Additionally, to illustrate the limited prosecution of online auction fraud, a Westlaw
search of state and federal cases concerning Internet/online auction/eBay fraud merely turns
up six adjudicated cases with some relevance to the combined search terms: United States v. Ga-
jdik, 292 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Nickens, Nos. 00-cr-00121 and 00-cr-00351, 38
Fed. Appx. 721, 2002 WL 993571 (3rd Cir. Apr. 12, 2002) (unpublished); United States v.
Blanchett, No. 01-3285, 2002 WL 511745 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 2002) (unpublished); Hendrickson v.
eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001); In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Lit., 114 F. Supp.
2d 955 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Lim v. The. TV Corp. Int'l., 99 Cal. App. 4th 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
12 Jennifer Lee, Web's Bloom Creates Gardenfor More Sophisticated Scammers, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11,
2002, § 4, at 8.
13 Glenn R. Simpson, EBay Coin Auctions Produce Allegations of "Shill" Bidding, WALL ST. J.,
June 12, 2000, at A3 (reporting that too much oversight into transactions may make eBay liable
for ones that go bad).
14 See Saul Hansell & Judith H. Dobrzynski, EBay Cancels Art Sale and Suspends Seller, N.Y.
TIMES, May 11, 2000, at Al (reporting that based on eBay's own estimates, approximately
200,000 eBay auctions, during 2000, involved fraud). See also Amitai Etzioni, E-Communities Build
New Ties, but Ties that Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2000, at G7 (stating that eBay's spokesman
claims fewer than one percent of their auctions involve fraud, but this number probably only
represents users complaining of non-payment or non-delivery of goods, rather than users who
have overpaid as a result of shill-bidding).
15 A shill is "[a] person who poses as an innocent bystander at a confidence game but actu-
ally serves as a decoy for the perpetrators of the scheme." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1382 (7th
ed. 1999). For shill bidding, the shill bids and competes with other potential buyers (while the
shill has no intention of buying), to ensure the selling price is higher than the owner might
otherwise receive in a "fair" auction. Interestingly, most cities have rigid laws regulating auction
conduct; however, rural towns may not, allowing for some country auctions to allow shill bid-
ding. Edward R. Lipinski, Using Auctions to Your Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1997, § 13, at
17D.
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delivery or non-payment 6 for goods, and in the user-feedback sys-
tem.17
A. Shill Bidding and Other Online Auction Fraud
EBay has been in business for approximately eight years, however
during that time, eBay has established only minimal, reactive controls
to seriously deter users who "shill bid" on their own goods. 8 Shill
bidding is accomplished by (a) a single user with many e-mail ac-
counts who uses those accounts to register to bid under numerous
identities, or (b) a consortium of users who agree on a plan to bid-
up/feel-out the maximum price that legitimate and honest users are
willing to pay.' 9 Criminally-minded users have little incentive not to
shill bid, as the cost for winning your own auction is merely the
commission rate on the money you never have to pay to yourself. °
Furthermore, a very small percentage of these infractions are proba-
bly discovered or reported to law enforcement authorities, while eBay
may merely suspend (for thirty days) first-time shill bidders and might
impose an indefinite suspension for subsequent acts.2' Nothing pre-
vents suspended users from re-registering with a new e-mail address
and user name.22
Other types of online fraud, such as the purported sale of fake or
nonexistent goods, or goods that are never delivered, are probably
more easily regulated by the free market than shill bidding. Poten-
16 See Lisa Guernsey, A New Caveat for eBay Users: Seller Beware, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2000, at G1
(reporting that credit card fraud is a major problem for online auction sellers).
17 The user-feedback system allows buyers and sellers to rate their experience; thus, giving
future buyers and sellers prospective information regarding trustworthiness. But see John
Schwartz, EBay Suspends Coin Seller Over Delivery Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at C4 (re-
porting that a seller whose eBay account was suspended for non-delivery of gold and silver coins
and bullion quickly returned to the online auction world by purchasing another user's feedback
file, "including the screen name and thousands of glowing testimonials from satisfied buyers").
18 Judith H. Dobrzynski, In Online Auction World, Hoaxes Aren't Easy to See, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2000, at Al (reporting that eBay's rules do not prevent users from using more than one screen-
name, nor do the site's policies prevent "friends from bidding on each other's offerings, push-
ing up the price, as long as the bidding is sincere") (emphasis added).
19 eBay Policies, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/hub.html ([click] "Rules for Sell-
ers") (last visited Apr. 21, 2003):
What is shill bidding? Shill bidding is the deliberate placing of bids to artificially raise
the price of an item and is not allowed. To avoid the appearance of being involved in
this activity, family members, friends, and individuals living together, working together
or sharing a computer should not bid on each other's items.
20 See Dobrzynski, supra note 18.
21 Id.
22 Even the more restricted policy for sellers can be circumvented by merely using new
credit card and bank accounts.
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tially fake or non-existent goods can be paid for by using a secure
payment (e.g., PayPal"3) or escrow system tied to a confirmed and
valid credit card.
Using Paypal, buyers pay the sellers when the auction ends
through an account that protects their credit card information, and
Paypal, unlike eBay, vigorously investigates payment fraud and irregu-
larities.14 With an escrow account, sellers would only ship goods after
notification by the certified escrow service regarding the service's re-
ceipt of buyers' payment.
The difficulty with regulating and preventing shill bidding derives
from the fact that no unique personal identification system exists (or
is trusted, for privacy reasons, by consumers) .2 For example, a single
user who signs up for America Online (AOL) is allowed to have seven
unique screen names. 6 It can easily be seen how a group, or a single
user who has signed up with more than one Internet Service Provider
(e.g., AOL, Verizon, Comcast, etc.), could manipulate the prices of
goods by using a combination of screen names. 7 Once the manipula-
tion begins, traditional pricing models based on supply, demand, and
scarcity break down. 8
Recent user authentication procedures (and their shortcomings)
are discussed more fully below.
23 http://www.paypal.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
24 See Brad Stone, Busting the Web Bandits, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2001, at 55.
25 EBay could make user verification mandatory, for a minimal cost per user, however verifi-
cation may scare off a considerable percentage of users. See EBay to Offer Free Insurance and ID
System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at C16 (reporting that Equifax, the largest national consumer-
credit reporting service, started a user-verification program in March 1999 where users register
their Social Security number, driver's license information and date of birth for a five dollar fee
and once authenticated, eBay gives authenticated users a special on-screen icon).
26 http://free.aol.com/tryaolfree/cdt.adp?139331 (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) (offering "7 E-
mail addresses").
27 See Brian Krebs, Trio Nabbed in E-Bay Bidding Fraud Scheme-Update, NEWSBYTES NEWS
NETWORK, Mar. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2816342 (reporting that Ken Walton and his shill
bidding ring obtained their identities by signing up for free e-mail addresses that required little
or no verifiable contact information and then shill bid on over 500 auctions over a year and a
half).
28 See Amy Harmon & Leslie Kaufman, Online Auctions: Let's Make a Deal Without the Haggle,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1999, at Al ("Economists say the blossoming of online bidding is no sur-
prise. Auctions are theoretically a very efficient form of commerce, the perfect nexus of the sup-
ply-and-demand curves.") (emphasis added).
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B. Framing the Problem-Aggregate Harm to Consumers and the Market
Most fraud-related eBay transactions are relatively small in value
(probably from tens of dollars up to a few thousand dollars).9 None-
theless, because of the epidemic level of these small scams, the aggre-
gate yearly consumer loss from Internet scams, where eBay represents
a majority, is estimated at $500 million.0 In any event, because eBay
and the law enforcement communities insist on viewing the fraud
problem as involving isolated individual instances-mostly small in
value and geographically diverse-they can justifiably ignore the issue
as hard-to-fix complaints of petty thievery. This view of the problem
is severely short-sighted because it fails to see the aggregate cost and
harm to consumers and the economy.
EBay employs some fraud-protection measures to identify and
prevent criminal activities; however, most of these safeguards were
only implemented as a reactionary response to prior complaints alleg-
ing that eBay is just as much a fraud facilitator as it is an online auc-
tion house. If eBay does not implement new user regulations that are
binding on all current and prospective users, requiring identity veri-
fication akin to credit checks, fraud (and the resulting economic
losses) will reach epidemic levels.
EBay's "let 'the market' determine our level of consumer protec-
tion" attitude is understandable from an economic standpoint, how-
ever, the law enforcement community's (both local and federal) lais-
sez-faire response is disturbing. The growing epidemic of online
auction and Internet-related fraud should be treated like the drug
war, and the law enforcement community must be given the appro-
priate tools to attach the auction fraud scourge on both the state and
federal levels. For this reason, to attack the growing online fraud
problem without violating our views of properly functioning federal-
ism, Congress must thoroughly investigate whether or not to police
the problem solely from a national level, or devise a system consisting
of aggressive intra- and inter-state online auction regulation and en-
forcement similar to the concept behind the current war on drugs.
The state and federal law enforcement communities do not know-
ingly allow thousands of street dealers to sell small amounts of mari-
juana, cocaine, ecstasy, or heroin because our society's mores insist
29 The current median loss is estimated at approximately $500. Lee, supra note 12, § 4, at 8.
And, for the initially successful scofflaws, instances of fraud can quickly accelerate into thou-
sands of dollars per item.
30 Chris Farnsworth & Chris Knap, Net Fraud is Tangled Web for Victims and Police, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Mar. 26, 2002, at ID (discussing the difficulties in catching online criminals).
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on reductions of the aggregate criminal, economic, and social ills
created by wide-spread drug use. Thus, in the drug war law enforce-
ment targets the street dealers, the local buyers and, eventually, the
organizational kingpins. Similarly, the federal government should
help states and localities to crack down on online auction fraud at its
different organizational levels (eBay's fraud policies, simple scam-
mers, and the well-organized racketeers) or give the individual states
the ability to take aggressive action. If either the local or national
government takes swift and effective action now, it may be able to
eradicate most of the online auction fraud while it is being facilitated
under a single regime (eBay) that may be relatively easy to analyze
and reform.
EBay's lax self-regulation leads to higher prices paid by, consumers
and, subsequently, bloated earnings based on revenues inflated by
the fraudulent activities of many eBay users . In its defense, eBay's
self-regulation proponents argue that if the site is required to comply
with all the laws regulating brick-and-mortar companies, eBay may be
badly hurt or destroyed. But it's hard to accept such an argument
from a company with a market capitalization of over
31 Similarly, if the record companies had not shut down Napster, they might have stemmed
the tide of piracy by negotiating a reasonable payment structure for file sharing of copyrighted
music. Nonetheless, because of the record industry's shortsightedness, they continue to lose
revenue as Gnutella-based file sharing programs have spread illicit copying exponentially.
12 See Press Release, supra note 7. In January 2003, eBay reported record revenues of $413.9
million (with a resulting $87.0 million net income) for its most recent quarter. Additionally,
during the last quarter of 2002, eBay hosted a record 195 million listings, confirmed registered
users totaling 61.7 million, and of those registered users, 27.7 million bid, bought or listed
goods on eBay over the trailing twelve months. Furthermore, eBay's revenue is determined by
getting a set percentage of each completed sale, plus a listing fee (regardless of whether the
item ultimately sells). See id.
3 One of the most egregious and embarrassing cases for elay involved a Sacramento lawyer,
Kenneth A. Walton, whose shill bidding ring resulted in a purported (but ultimately fake) Rich-
ard Diebenkorn painting that was bid-up from $0.25 to $135,805. Speculation on the painting's
authenticity was prompted by Walton bidding $4,500 on his own offering during the auction's
second day. Furthermore, Walton is known to have used at least five user-names while buying
and selling on eBay. Dobrzynski, supra note 18, at Al. See alsoJohn Schwartz &Judith Dobrzyn-
ski, 3 Men Are Charged With Fraud In 1,100 Art Auctions on EBay, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2001, at Al
(reporting that Walton and his accomplices were charged with placing approximately 1,100
shill bids between October 1998 and May 2000, using screen-names such as "big-fat-mamba-
jambas").
34 See Michael Liedtke, Fray over eBay, DESERET NEWS, June 28, 2000, at Cl.
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$24,100,00,00035 and holding an 85% market share in an industry
representing possibly 87% of all online crime.36
While hard figures are not available for the percentage of buyers
and sellers defrauded (due to undetected shills or non-reporting vic-
tims) ,37 evidence gathered by various groups indicates that many users
question the validity and "value" being derived from this relatively
new online market. Despite increasing evidence of fraud and the
possible penalties for shill-bidding schemes, including punishment
under federal money laundering, mail, and wire fraud laws (with
each infraction carrying a maximum penalty of five years in jail and
$1,000,000 in fines),3 9 apparently auction fraud has not waned.
Therefore, cracking down on Internet fraud may require novel and
ingenious methods of attack, including coordination among various
federal and state agencies.4° In anticipation of the need to enforce
trans-jurisdiction problems involving Internet fraud, in 1998 the Fed-
eral Trade Commission set up SafeBid, providing training and case
referrals to local, state and federal agencies tracking Internet auction
fraud.4' This action, by itself, lends some support for state regulation
of Internet auctions; but more vigilant action is needed, including a
hard look at whether current notions of the dormant Commerce
Clause42 (precluding regulation of some Internet commerce) violates
federalism's basic presumptions.
35 Yahoo Finance Stock Quotes, at http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=EBAY&d=t (last visited
Apr. 12, 2003).
36 Nick Wingfield, EBay Auction Fraud Detected With New Software, INTERNET WIRE, Feb. 12,
2001, available at 2001 WL 17534645 (reporting estimates by eMarketer Inc., a provider of
Internet statistics).
37 Schwartz, supra note 17 (reporting that in 2000, 10,800 of 25,000 total complaints to the
Federal Trade Commission regarding Internet fraud concerned auctions). However, eBay
claims it receives approximately 27 fraud complaints per one million auctions. Internet Auction-
eer Facing Fraud Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 26, 1999, at C26.
Internet Fraud Complaint Center, Internet Auction Fraud Report (May 2001), at
http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/AuctionFraudReport.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
39 Judith H. Dobrzynski, FB.I. Opens Investigation of EBay Bids, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2000, at
C1.
'0 Steve Lohr, Policing the Internet: Anyone but Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, § 4, at 3
(discussing the Internet's vulnerability to cyber-vandals).
41 Jim Carlton & Pui-Wing Tam, Controversial eBay Sale Highlights Growing Problem of Fraud
Online, WALL ST.J. EUR., May 15, 2000, at 31 (discussing instances of online fraud, including the
sale of a forged Diebenkorn painting).
42 See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) ("The negative or dormant im-
plication of the Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation, or regulation, that discriminates
against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby imped[es] free private trade in the
national marketplace.") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL RECIPES FOR PROTECTING BIDDERS:
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
To prevent shill bidding and other online auction fraud, Congress
could either continue to regulate the online auction business under
its Commerce Clause powers, 3 or Congress could grant the individual
states the power to regulate and enforce certain aspects of the online
auction process. With a cooperative intra-state regulatory scheme in
place, Congress (through the Federal Trade Commission and Federal
Bureau of Investigation) would maintain oversight over measures im-
plemented to reduce fraud. Thus, Congress would only have to in-
tervene and pass more restrictive online auction laws (preempting
the states' initiatives) if certain states failed to adopt mandated mini-
mum protections for consumers. Congressional consent for these
new state laws may be necessary because without it, due to the inter-
state nature of the Internet and Internet commerce, the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate any unilaterally imposed
state regulation."
The dormant Commerce Clause is a judicially-created doctrine
prohibiting states from maintaining laws that overly burden interstate
commerce.45  Despite the fact that Congress has not expressly regu-
lated an area of interstate commerce, states may not impose laws that
facially discriminate against such commerce under the dormant
Commer Clause rationale. Nor may states impose laws that exces-
sively burden interstate commerce, despite not being deemed facially
discriminatory or protectionist.46 Furthermore, the dormant Com-
43 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. ("The Congress shall have Power .... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States ....").
44 See cases cited supra notes 3, 42 and accompanying text.
45 SeeJack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
YALE L.J. 785 (2001). Nonetheless, the Commerce Clause does not invalidate all state restric-
tions on commerce. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (quoting S.
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) ("[I]n the absence of conflicting legislation by
Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local con-
cern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent,
regulate it.") ).
46 See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959); Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 320
U.S. 408 (1946); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); N.Y. State Dairy Foods, Inc. v.
Northeast Dairy Compact Comm'n, 198 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); ACLU v.Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149,
1161 (10th Cir. 1999); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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merce Clause helps to prevent impediments to the free flow of na-
tional commerce.
To understand the complexity of the problem and numerous ave-
nues for greater oversight (and better consumer protections), some
aspects of the eBay business model must-be explained. Therefore, the
following section gives a more detailed overview of eBay's business
and policies. A critique of why these policies are ineffective to pre-
vent fraud will follow, including specific instances of fraud and how it
could be prevented if eBay took proactive measures that do more
than pay lip-service to the idea of aggressively combating fraud.
III. EBAY'S BUSINESS
A. eBay Defined
EBay bills itself as "The World's Online Marketplace," and empha-
sizes on its user agreement page that although eBay is "commonly re-
ferred to as an online auction" site, eBay is not a traditional auction-
eer.48 Nevertheless, on its initial page, eBay promotes auctions.49 By
definition, an auctioneer is a person "legally authorized to sell goods
or lands of other persons at public auction for a commission or fee. ' °
And an auction is the "sale of property to the highest bidder."5
Technically, eBay may not fit under the traditional auction definition,
but word-usage changes as the nature of activities change, including
the medium.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, eBay is running auctions. EBay
set up the protocols and conduits allowing sellers to list their wares
on its site, as well as the search engine and automated, graduated
bidding system to be used by potential buyers.53 All of the essential
information and mechanisms for facilitating both the buying and sell-
47 See Abigail B. Pancoast, A Test Case For Re-Evaluation of the Dormant Commerce Clause: The
Maine Rx Program, 4 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 184, 191-92 (2001).
48 User Agreement, eBay, Inc. (Apr. 19, 2002), at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/
png-user.html ("eBay is a Venue.") (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
49 http://www.ebay.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
50 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 126.
51 Id. at 125.
52 When television came on the air, it was still broadcasting, despite the transmission of pic-
tures rather than just voice. Prior to the development of television, broadcasting was merely the
transmission of voice, through some type of amplified speaker apparatus.
53 See Lisa Guernsey, Night of the Living Bid: Four Tales From an Hour of Ebay, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 1999, at G7. During the initial bidding process, users enter their maximum bid price.
EBay's servers then act as a proxy bidder, entering new amounts for your bid as needed, up to
the maximum price you are willing to pay.
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ing of offered goods can only be accomplished through the eBay sys-
tem. And, despite the fact that the seller and buyer have to finalize
the sale outside eBay's purview, eBay is guaranteed its commission
through an automated charge to the seller's credit card based on the
auction-winning price. Therefore, despite the lack of paddle-
waiving, number-calling, and gavel-pounding, eBay is running mod-
ern, new-economy auctions.
EBay handles approximately 85% of all online auctions 5  During
the fourth-quarter of 2002, eBay handled $4,600,000,000 (yes, that's
billion) in sales.5 6 Net profit for the quarter was $87,000,000 on reve-
nues of $413,000,000.57 In 2001, the company claimed that among its
422 million items listed, there were an estimated 42,000 confirmed
fraud cases. Additionally, eBay's spokesperson, Kevin Pursglove, is
consistently quoted as saying that confirmed fraud occurs in less than
one-tenth of one percent of all eBay transactions.9 However, this sta-
tistic is misleading because it is merely based on eBay's internal
measurement of insurance claims filed with the company.6° Never-
theless, available statistics support the conclusion that, while there are
approximately nine million items available for sale each day,6 ap-
proximately 900 fraudulent offers are posted each day.62
Seventy-five percent of reported fraud claims involve allegations
that the seller has failed to deliver a paid-for product.63 However, this
statistic may be misleading because a more prevalent and sinister type
of fraud, usually unknown to its victims, may be occurring in the
background and thus going unreported: phantom bidding and shill
bidding.64 Both phantom and shill bidding are criminal actions un-
54 For a description of eBay's revenue-generating fees, see infra notes 84-91 and accompany-
ing text.
Swartz, supra note 6.
56 Press Release, supra note 7.
57 Id.
58 Swartz, supra note 6.
59 Jerry Adler, The EBay Way of Life, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2002, at 50. See also Bob Sullivan,
Auction fraud on the rise, some say, MSNBC, July, 29, 2002, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/
7 84132.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
60 Mike Brunker, EBay's Tough Talk on Fraud Doesn't Withstand Scrutiny, MSNBC, Oct. 9, 2002,
available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/809148.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) ("No Hint Law
Enforcement Notified").
61 See Nancy Salem, Do You EBay?, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., August 12, 2002, at 6.
62 William Porter, The Wide World of EBay, DENVER POST, July 25, 2002, at Fl.
63 Id.
64 See Brunker, supra note 60 (describing that "phantom bidding" is when a seller manipu-
lates his own auction by using additional screen names to bid on his own goods, thereby fraudu-
lently raising the final price of the sold goods). "Shill bidding" has the same effect as phantom
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der state and federal law, and constitute violations of civil law as
well.65
EBay's business model is designed to generate revenues from
maintaining a popular marketplace where high volume is the goal-
in terms of number of goods sold and (hopefully) high prices from
competitive bidding. Thus, eBay's primary revenues are derived from
a combination of listing fees and commissions earned that are based
on an item's final selling price.
B. User Registration
Sellers must register (via credit or debit card) with eBay prior to
initially listing items for sale.66 This automation guarantees that eBay
receives its listing fee as soon as an item is registered and, in a suc-
cessful auction, eBay charges its commission when the specific auc-
tion's bidding window closes (assuming at least one person bids over
any reserve price).
Buyers are not required to register with eBay as long as they pro-
vide a traceable e-mail address (i.e., not ones freely available like
@hotmail.com or @yahoo.com).67 If a bidder has a traceable e-mail
address (eBay probably infers), they are probably less likely to fail to
consummate a transaction resulting from a winning bid. And, if the
bidder fails to pay, the bidder might be tracked down from the given
e-mail address or associated Internet Service Provider. However, a
bidder who uses an anonymous Hotmail-type account, and therefore
must verify her identity with a credit card, is an easier to locate poten-
tial breaching party. Nevertheless, other than buyers who fail to pay,
there is probably infrequent buyer-related fraud because prudent
bidding, however, instead of one user manipulating the system, a conspiracy between/among
users manipulates the auction to maximize the final selling price. See id.
65 See Stormy Weathers, Inc. v. FDIC, 834 F. Supp. 519, 523 (D.N.H. 1993) (indicating that
the seller may not participate in the bidding process, directly or indirectly, unless the seller ex-
pressly announces that he is reserving such privilege; and the seller is not allowed to secretly bid
for the purpose of enhancing the final selling price). See also U.C.C. § 2-328(4) (1992), available
at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/2/2-328.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) (including com-
ments indicating that there is a common-law prohibition against undisclosed seller participation
in auction bidding); http://www.maineantiquedigest.com/articles/ethi0
70 0 .htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2003) ("What the Law Says About Sellers Bidding at Auction").
See Seller Guide, eBay, Inc., at http://pages.ebay.com/sell/guide.html ([click] "Set up an
account") (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
67 eBay Education, eBay, Inc., at http://pages.ebay.com/education/options/index
.html#buy ("How to Buy on eBay") (last visited, Apr. 12, 2003); Buyer Guide, eBay, Inc., at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/buyerguide/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
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sellers wait to ship goods until payment is received and the funds are
authenticated.
C. Seller Authentication (a fertile culture for epidemic fraud)
Despite its seller-authentication system, eBay claims that user au-
thentication on the Internet is difficult and eBay "cannot and does
not confirm each user's purported identity. '68 It is exactly this dis-
crepancy, between the seller and buyer authentication methods, that
facilitates all kinds of Internet fraud, including shill bidding.69 How-
ever, if each buyer had to link their bank account and credit card in-
formation to his screen name, overall fraud would probably decrease
because of the relative ease of finding and prosecuting offenders.
Single-user shill bidding would also be relatively easy to detect be-
cause most users probably have few credit card/bank account combi-
nations that can be used without duplication." Nevertheless, shill-
bidding rings (multiple users acting in concert) would still be rela-
tively difficult to detect without some kind of software to analyze the
combinations of various buyer-user names repeatedly bidding on a
specific seller's goods.7'
D. Verifying User-Provided Information
Technologically, eBay recently signed a security/fraud-prevention
agreement with VeriSign, to run limited background information
checks (scheduled to begin in mid- to late-2002) on all new eBay sell-
68 User Agreement, supra note 48 ("Safe Trading").
69 See "Frequently Asked Questions about Shill Bidding," at http://pages.ebay.com/help/
basics/f-shilling.html ("Shill bidding is the deliberate placing of bids to artificially drive up the
price of an item. This is also known as 'bid padding' and is not allowed.") (last visited Apr. 12,
2003). See also "Shill Bidding: What It Is and Why It's Not Permitted on eBay," at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/shillbidding.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003); "Mem-
ber Violations: Questionable Bidding: Seller Bidding on their Own Auctions," at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/rulesandsafety/43010001.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003); "Mem-
ber Violations: Questionable Bidding: Bidder Always Bids with Same Bidders," at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/rulesandsafety/43010003.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003); "Mem-
ber Violations: Questionable Bidding: Bidder Always Bids on Same Seller," at
http://pages.ebay.com/help/rulesandsafety/43010002.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
70 Furthermore, unlike users who fail to pay for or send goods following a completed auc-
tion, shill bidders, especially continually successful ones, have every incentive to give valid in-
formation for at least one of their online personas to build trust and reputation for future swin-
dles.
71 EBay currently only sporadically employs proprietary software, like "Shill Hunter" (a ser-
vice whose workings eBay's management, for security reasons, refuses to describe), to identify
shills as they happen. See Schwartz & Dobrzynski, supra note 33.
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ers.7 2 Under this agreement, VeriSign will mine databases of phone
numbers, addresses and credit reports to verify that addresses and
phone numbers provided by new sellers are legitimate.73 With this in-
formation, eBay claims the system will filter out a significant amount
of phony contact information, including those sellers who are trying
to conduct eBay-related business from hotels, motels, 
prisons, etc. "
Despite the ambitiousness of this new identity identification plan,
it has two major flaws. First, VeriSign's system won't actually confirm
that the sellers actually live at the addresses provided, but merely that
the addresses aren't suspicious (known hotel, motel or prison ad-
dresses) . Second, the VeriSign registration will only affect newcom-
76
ers, not eBay's current legion of users.
EBay has not yet chosen to institute a more rigorous and thor-
ough real-time VeriSign-proposed program that can provide back-
ground checks that include verification tools based on monthly
mortgage payments, credit card limits, and financial account bal-
ances.77  EBay claims that privacy concerns for its users caused the
company to hesitate to institute these additional checks.' However,
the company anticipates using this second tier of verification for pro-
spective high-price transactions.75
72 David Colker, EBay to Digitally Verify New Sellers, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at C3; VeriSign
Signs Pact With eBay to Fight Fraud on Auction Site, WALL ST.J., May 8, 2002, at A9.
73 L.A. Lorek, Internet Cops Fight Online Auction Fraud, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, July, 7,
2002, at 1K.
74 VeriSign Signs Pact with eBay to Fight Fraud on Auction Site, supra note 72.
75 Id.
76 See Colker, supra note 72 ("Only new sellers will be affected.").
77 VeriSign Sign's Pact with eBay to Fight Fraud on Auction Site, supra note 72.
78 Id. See also Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809, 812 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing that
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681a-1681u, imposes "vari-
ous obligations to protect the privacy and accuracy of credit information" held by consumer
reporting agencies); Baker v. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co., No. Civ. A. 02-26-JBC, 2002
WL 1205065, at *2 (W.D. Ky., May 28, 2002) (finding that the Fair Credit Reporting Act
("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., "prohibits disclosure of an individual's credit report except
under certain, enumerated 'permissible' circumstances"). And, these "permissible" circum-
stances, under §1681(b), include procedures that are "fair and equitable to the consumer, with
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information."
Thus, if eBay decides to implement more stringent background checks, any information it (or
its agent) gathers may become subject to the FCRA. Nonetheless, if eBay does not plan to dis-
close any of that information, except to a legitimate law enforcement probe, the argument that
these more stringent checks will violate consumer privacy rights is not persuasive. Furthermore,
if eBay requires the additional information as a condition to using its site, the user may choose
to provide the information or use a different marketplace.
79 Greg Wiles, EBay, VeriSign Enter Agreement for Verifying Sellers, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 8,
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Economics (i.e. the cost of the additional checks) is influencing
eBay's decision, but the separate layers of protection adopted for
relatively lower priced goods versus expensive ones creates second-
class citizen status for most of eBay's buyers (who buy relatively low-
priced goods). Thus, the majority of eBay's users may face the pros-
pect of being swindled out of hundreds if not thousands of dollars
because of minor privacy concerns.0 This is a justifiable marginal
additional cost for eBay to aggregate enough information to red-flag
questionable user-practices that may deter criminal activity or help
build civil or criminal cases against fraudulent parties.
At a minimum, the new less-stringent verification tools should be
implemented against all new and existing users (buyers and sellers
alike). Such an update would be extremely easy to implement-the
next time a user decided to sign-in or transact on eBay, they would be
prompted to read and agree-to a new user policy regarding fraud
protection. This alert would be just as binding and effective as any
new user agreement update that eBay requests that members assent
to through non-passive click-wrap agreements."'
For buyers, a universal update in registration requirements will
serve as an active tool against, and a deterrent to, deadbeat bidding
(buyers not paying after winning an auction) and shills. If all buyers
are prospectively required to provide credit card information, billing
addresses, and phone numbers, this information could be easily veri-
fied and used to cross-reference against other registered users (to fil-
ter out potential shills), users who have previously violated eBay poli-
cies, or those who are known to have failed to consummate a
completed transaction.
Not surprisingly, many of eBay's additional fraud protection tools
are unreported, to prevent criminals from developing methods and
80 I do not mean to discount even minor infringements of personal privacy, however, we
must look at privacy on a sliding scale, balancing our own personal privacy with the needs of
society and economic security.
81 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Martin H.
Samson, Click-Wrap Agreement Held Enforceable, available at http://www.phillipsnizer.com/
artnew27.htm. (last visited Apr. 12, 2003). Samson defines click-wrap agreements as a situation
where
[a] party posts terms on its website pursuant to which it offers to sell goods or services.
To buy these goods, the purchaser is required to indicate his assent to be bound by the
terms of the offer by his conduct, typically the act of clicking on a button stating "I
agree." Once the purchaser indicates his assent to be bound, the contract is formed on
the posted terms, and the sale is consummated. No paper record is created nor is the
signature of the purchaser required.
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schemes to bypass the security measures." EBay periodically notes
that it uses a program called "Shill Hunter" to detect suspicious, co-
ordinated buying and selling activities. 3
E. Fee Structure
Currently, to merely list an item on eBay, it costs a minimum of
$0.30-$3.00, a graduated fee schedule depending on either the start-
ing (no reserve) or reserve price8 4 There are additional fees charged
for listing enhancements (i.e., utilizing bold type, including a
thumbnail picture, or being a "featured item")."' Fees can also be-
come substantial if an item is listed at one of eBay's specialty stores or
services, such as vehicles sold through eBay Motors or real estate
transactions. Listing fees are non-refundable."
EBay earns commissions based on an item's final sale price.' If
the auction is successful, the seller is immediately charged a commis-
sion based on the "closing bid."8 The commission is calculated on a
graduated scale depending on the closing bid.8 9 Additionally, now
that eBay owns PayPal, transactions completed by sellers accepting
payment by credit card will be assessed an additional 2.2% or 2.9%
82 See Nick Wingfield, Elusive Figures: An eBay Merchant Disappears, Failing to Deliver the Goods,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2002, at Al ("EBay says it has an arsenal of fraud prevention weapons,
many of which it won't disclose.").
83 Jim Carlton & Ken Bensinger, Phony Bids Put EBay on Defensive, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2000,
at BI.
84 See "Fees Overview," at http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html ([click] "Insertion
Fees") (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
85 Id. ([click] "Final Value Fees").
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. The graduated fees are calculated by using the following chart from eBay's web page:
Closing Value Final Value Fee
$0- $25 j 5.25% of the closing value
$ 5.25% of the initial $25 ($1.31),
$25 -$1,000 Iplus 2.75% of the remaining closing value balance ($25.01 to $1,000)
5.25% of the initial $25 ($1.31),
Over $1,000 plus 2.75% of the initial $25 -$1000 ($26.81),
plus 1.50% of the remaining closing value balance ($1000.01 - closing
value)
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plus $0.30 for the privilege/protection of using PayPal. Other typesof payment transfers utilizing PayPal are free!"
F Feedback Forum
In addition to requiring sellers to register and provide financial
information, 2 eBay also encourages users to rely on its Feedback Fo-
rum to determine the credibility of respective buyers and sellers.i'
EBay's management touts the review of users' feedback as the best
defense against fraud or other problems arising during a transac-
tion.94 Proven limitations of the soundness of eBay's Feedback Forum
and its credibility are described below.
Thus, the combination of the lack of a reliable self-policing feed-
95back system, dependence on Power Sellers, and a flawed user-
identity-authentication only makes eBay more attractive to the crimi-
nally-minded while posing an ever-expanding menu of types of fraud
that need policing.
G. Current Initiatives to Combat Fraud
To combat fraud, eBay employs both traditional human investiga-
tors and technological tools. The in-house fraud investigation team
consists of merely 20 fraud investigators.96 This limited number of
go Id. ([click] "PayPal fees").
91 Id.
92 See discussion supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
9, See "Feedback Forum," at http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (describ-
ing how the Feedback Forum operates) (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
94 Nick Wingfield, Are You Satisfied? EBay's Battle Against Fraud Rests Primarily on a Simple Con-
cept: Customer Feedback, WALL ST.J., Sept. 16, 2002, at R7.
95 Power Sellers are defined by eBay as:
the pillars of our community.. . committed to upholding and embracing the "core
community values" that are the very foundation of eBay. They are exemplary members
who are held to the highest standards of professionalism, having achieved and main-
tained a 98% positive feedback rating and an excellent sales performance record.
http://pages.ebay.com/services/buyandsell/powersellers.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003).
It must be noted that Power Sellers, because selling on eBay is probably their primary method
of income, have a great incentive to take whatever actions are necessary to pad their bottom-
line. Additionally, these types of sellers are also more likely to have multiple (if not scores of)
email addresses available to them (or their workers/helpers, if applicable) to serve as
shills/purported potential buyers. Thus, to make sure an item reaps a lucrative profit, an eBay
business can use its staff to monitor the current prove and, using its multiple email addresses,
bump up the price toward the end of the auction. Profit building can also be accomplished
through bid-sniping software that is programmed to manipulate an auction within the last min-
utes (or seconds).
96 Wingfield, supra note 82.
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human resources seems woefully inadequate, despite eBay's techno-
logical tools, for a business listing millions of auctions per day. These
investigators are known to only contact law enforcement if there is
significant evidence of wrongdoing." However, as this paper will
show, not even clear and convincing evidence of user-wrongdoing will
probably lead to much more than a warning or short suspension of a
user's privileges.98
IV. REMEDIAL MEASURES
A. Initial Remedial Measures Needed
Effective new fraud protection measures will require the aggrega-
tion and analysis of sensitive personal identifying information from
eBay's users. Thus, the government (federal, state or both) and eBay,
working together, need to adopt an effective but reasonable (and
adaptable) regime that balances individual privacy with collective se-
curity. Critics of government regulation will attack a regulatory re-
gime as unnecessarily paternalistic and economically inefficient;
however, our capitalistic democracy has indicated broad support for
the government's role in protecting against harms of this type. Fur-
thermore, the most efficient system would not be an autocratic gov-
ernment mandate, but a partnership with eBay in creating appropri-
ate protocols.
From a social policy perspective, it is with strong public support
that the government aggressively regulates economic crimes and inef-
ficiencies, especially monopolistic business acts, tax scofflaws, and se-
curities fraud. Our society does not condone criminal acts purely
based on economic theories that a capitalist economy is most efficient
when providers and consumers act based solely on economic incen-
tives. Moreover, as the current capital markets scandal indicates,
most market participants and consumers demand that their govern-
ment root out crimes creating a fraud on the market.
97 Id.
98 See Michael Brunker, Cautionary tales of two auctions, MSNBC, Oct. 10, 2002, at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/818257.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2003) (discussing investigative
findings that phantom bids by revenue-generating "power sellers" merely draw warnings, not
suspensions, from eBay and that the auction site also failed to shut down an alleged stamp-
forgery ring, run by a power seller, despite conclusive evidence of its existence); Brunker, supra
note 60 (MSNBC findings that wrongdoing goes unpunished, despite conclusive evidence of
fraud).
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B. If Remedial Measures Fail
If eBay fails to get serious about policing online auction fraud, the
federal government should take aggressive action to: (1) financially
sanction the company for knowingly condoning fraud, and (2) force
both the implementation and strict regulation of new; aggressive con-
sumer protection measures. Since eBay seems to only care about its
financial bottom-line,"9 the company may only be persuaded to pro-
vide effective, proactive consumer protections when its profits are re-
duced by the combination of government-imposed fines and forced
regulation. Private causes of action (including class-action lawsuits)
would probably be just as effective, but it would take years for them to
work through the state and federal courts. Furthermore, eBay has
found no legal, moral, or economic incentive to institute fraud-
reduction policies and penalties that may push lucrative business
partners (so-called "Power Sellers") away, merely because they swin-
dle buyers once in a while.""° Therefore, either eBay's stockholders,
users, or the government needs to provide appropriate disincentives
to eBay, emphasizing to the company that condoning rampant fraud
is not part of an acceptable business model.
V. REGULATION?
A. Regulation Alternatives
There are three alternatives for addressing the shill bidding prob-
lem regarding online auctions: (1) Congress could directly regulate
online auctions, invoking its Commerce Clause powers; (2) auction
sites could be allowed to continue to self-regulate; or (3) Congress
could give states the authority and jurisdiction to regulate end-user
auction activity by having the states update and modify existing con-
sumer protection laws. As discussed above, self-regulation has not
worked because of online auctioneers' economic disincentive to do
so until they see fraud as deterring large numbers of users from com-
ing to their site.
The third proposal, allowing states to regulate in their traditional
consumer protection role, may trigger the dormant Commerce
Clause, requiring Congressional consent because Internet transac-
99 Brunker, supra note 60.
100 Brunker, supra note 98.
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tions are predominantly interstate.'0 ' Notwithstanding initial Con-
gressional consent, Congress could provide guidelines to the states
regarding appropriate minimal protections, remedies, and punish-
ments for fraudulent users as well as for online auction sites whose
protection measures (or lack thereof) facilitated the fraudulent activ-
it .102ity.
' °
B. Self-Regulation is Not the Answer
Self-regulation has failed miserably, despite claims of a very low
percentage of fraud in relation to total number of auctions.0  Self-
regulation overlooks the fact that alleged fraud statistics are probably
not accurate in light of all of the non-detected criminal activity and
that the so-called low percentage of fraud constitutes thousands, if
not tens (or hundreds) of thousands of fraudulent activities per
year.0 4  Much of this criminal activity, likely unknown to the de-
frauded user(s), could be easily prevented by creating systems that
deter criminals while having a minimal annoyance-factor to law-
abiding users. Regrettably, by characterizing fraud rates with a low
percentage rather than an estimated aggregate number, auction sites
instill honest users with a false sense of security while protecting their
revenues. As long as the majority of shill bidding goes undetected
and can be characterized as "insignificant" by online auction sites,
those sites can boast impressive revenues based in part on bloated
commissions paid by defrauded buyers. Online auctioneers have an
incentive to let crime remain unchecked, thus, the most effective
method to stop online auction fraud may be to attach liability not
101 Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (stating that Congress can allow states to
regulate activities that would otherwise be subject to federal preemption because, unlike the
Equal Protection Clause, the Commerce Clause is not an absolute federal power).
102 Unilateral state action, without Congressional guidance, would surely bring constitutional
scrutiny and analysis under the three-part balancing test developed in Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). The Kassel test weighs and balances the following factors:
(i) the rationality of the state law; (ii) the balance between burdens on interstate commerce and
the local benefits sought by the state legislature; and (iii) the notion that protectionist laws are
unconstitutional regardless of reasons. Id.
103 See Press Release, supra note 7 (regarding eBay's internal estimates of online auction
fraud).
104 Hansell & Dobrzynski, supra note 14 (reporting that based on eBay's own estimates, ap-
proximately 200,000 eBay auctions, during 2000, involved fraud). See also Etzioni, supra note 14
(indicating that eBay's spokesman claims fewer than one percent of their auctions involve
fraud, but this number probably only represents users complaining of non-payment or non-
delivery of goods, rather than users who have overpaid as a result of shill-bidding).
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only to the perpetrators, but also the entity capable of significantly
reducing crime, the online auctioneer. "
VI. IS THE LAW ON EBAY'S SIDE?
To be fair, while it can be argued that eBay knows there is a con-
siderable amount of shady activity being facilitated by their market-
place, a number of judicial opinions have supported theories that the
company may not be liable for some tyPes of fraudulent acts perpe-
trated by users. In Gentry v. eBay, Inc., the California Court of Ap-
peals found that eBay was immune from liability for posting informa-
tion by third parties that resulted in fraudulent sales of sports
memorabilia because the sales were conducted by third parties."7
Under 47 U.S.C. Section 230, as incorporated into the Communica-
tions Decency and Telecommunications Act, there is "federal immu-
nity to any cause of action that would make interactive service provid-
ers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service.' 0 8  Thus, eBay has been "exempted from liability over an
item's authenticity, value and origin."'5 '
Additionally, there is some case law, relying on questionable logic,
holding that eBay may be considered a passive Internet Service Pro-
vider (ISP) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)," °
thereby making eBay immune to tort liability resulting from fraudu-
lent user activity."1 ' If this ruling were extended by analogy to eBay's
argument that it is not participating in the auctions (under the tradi-
tional notions of an auctioneer), the harm to the auction market-
place and consumers will be compounded. Auction sites, because of
the nature and focus of their business (including control over user
participation and content), should not be afforded tort liability pro-
tections given to "true" ISPs like America Online (AOL), the Micro-
105 James M. Snyder, Note, Online Auction Fraud: Are the Auction Houses Doing All They Should or
Could to Stop Online Fraud ?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 453, 465 (2000) (discussing that self-regulation of
a fledgling technology industry has failed miserably before, including the 900-number industry
and the resulting strict federal regulations).
106 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
107 Id. See also eBay Doesn't Sell Merchandise, Can't Be Liable For Fraudulent Sales, E-BUSINESS L.
BULL., August 2002, at 1.
108 Id.
109 Mary Anne Ostrom, Some Deal on eBay Are a Little Too "Hot": Online Auctions Becoming a Con-
duitfor Stolen Items, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, June 30, 2002, at 21A.
1o 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2003).
I Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (2001) (explaining that "passive" ISPs
may have safe harbor protections for copyright infringements by "active" users).
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soft Network (MSN), or AT&T."2 Online auction houses probably fail
to meet the policy standards for exempting ISPs despite current court
rulings that fail to understand what constitutes a passive ISP."3
A. Resources and Remediation
Direct, uniform Congressional regulations might work to curb
online auction fraud, but, the federal court system is already over-
worked and different states may want to offer an array of consumer
protections above and beyond whatever watered-down regulation
emerges after debate and compromise within Congress. Instead of
allowing such a Congressional bill to be the ceiling for national
Internet consumer protections, allowing the states to regulate under
minimal Congressional guidelines would merely establish the floor or
foundation that could be built upon to strengthen consumer confi-
dence.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
In the leading Internet case dealing with the dormant Commerce
Clause, American Libraries Association v. Pataki, the district court may
have misinterpreted dormant Commerce Clause precedents in decid-
ing that Internet commerce may not be regulated by individual state
laws."l4 The American Libraries court found that the burden of state
laws on interstate commerce greatly outweigh the regulatory benefit
to the state." 5 Additionally, the court argued that indiscriminate and
uncoordinated state regulation would only frustrate Internet
growth."6 Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit, in American Civil Liberties
Union v. Johnson, invalidated a New Mexico law regulating Internet
112 See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937
(1998); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (exempting ISPs from liability
based on users' published statements).
113 Mary M. Calkins, Notes & Comments, My Reputation Always Had More Fun Than Me: The
Failure of eBay's Feedback Model to Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 33
(2001) (explaining that the DMCA limits liability for ISPs because they provide a significant
societal benefit of inexpensive, user-friendly Internet access; however, online auction houses do
not provide such an essential service).
114 Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 169 ("[T] he Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a
national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most extreme,
could paralyze development of the Internet altogether.").
16 Id. at 183 (stating that regulation by individual states will force users to "comply with the
regulation imposed by the state with the most stringent standard or forego Internet communi-
cation").
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content that is potentially harmful to minors."7 The court found that
the statute: (1) regulated conduct occurring entirely outside the
state; (2) was not reasonable; (3) was an undue burden on interstate
commerce; and (4) subjected Internet use to inconsistent state laws.'18
Nevertheless, the ACLU and American Libraries rulings may contra-
dict the Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause precedent estab-
lished in Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality,"" a
ruling built upon the balancing tests established in Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp."° and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.' Under the Ore-
gon Waste test, the court should first determine whether a statute
regulates evenhandedly (and only incidentally affecting interstate
commerce) or discriminates against interstate commerce.'22 Second,
if the offending statute regulates evenhandedly, the court analyzes
the law's effect on interstate commerce.2 3 Finally, if the law's effect is
an excessive burden on interstate commerce, it may be found to violate
the dormant Commerce Clause, despite its evenhandedness.2 4
The Pike court established a balancing test for situations where a
state law is not facially discriminatory, but still results in a burden on
interstate commerce. "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on inter-
state commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the bur-
den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.' 25  Furthermore, state regulations may not
"adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to incon-
sistent regulations.'
26
117 ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999).
1 See Ari Lanin, Note, Who Controls the Internet? States'Rights and the Reawakening of the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1440 (2000).
19 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) ("[T]he first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny
under the negative dormant Commerce Clause is to determine whether it 'regulates evenhand-
edly with only incidental effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate
commerce.'") (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
120 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (discussing the need to
weigh states' interests and the states' regulations' impact on the Commerce Clause).
121 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that "the validity of state statutes affecting interstate
commerce" depends on balancing local interests with effects on interstate commerce).
12 Discrimination, under the dormant Commerce Clause is "differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." Oregon
Waste, 511 U.S. at 99.
123 Id.
124 Id. See also Sabra-Anne Kelin, State Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 435, 452 (2001).
125 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. See also, Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 788-89 (2001).
126 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
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These rulings, however, do not require state law uniformity-
many interstate conglomerates are subject to the disparities in state
laws, including various tort and contract doctrines. Additionally,
Supreme Court dicta suggests that a law might be upheld, despite
other states' divergent laws, if the enacting state is able to prove that
the regulation is a valid safety - 11
Ironically, in American Libraries, the court analogized the offending
Internet regulations to those for a highway or railroad. 2 9  Even
though the Supreme Court had previously found that the dormant
Commerce Clause does not forestall all state action affecting inter-
state commerce, including highways used for interstate travel.3 '
Moreover, state regulations enacted to protect citizens' health, safety,
or welfare may be upheld unless the state's justifications for the regu-
lation are illusory.3
Instead of applying the interstate highway or railroad analysis to
Internet regulation, it may be more appropriate to analogize bur-
geoning Internet case law to state regulations of interstate telegraph
transmissions from nearly a century ago. 32 During the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court was inclined to find that telegraph
transmission regulation was purely under the aegis of federal regula-
tors. 3 3 However, by 1910, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial
Milling Co., the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan law imposing ob-
ligations on a telegraph company to deliver interstate messages. ' As
a result of the Western Union ruling, states were allowed to impose
non-uniform liability limitations, "thereby defeating the 'necessity of
one uniform plan of regulation' upon which" earlier telegraph cases
based their rulings.3 Thus, "the state where a telegraph contract was
made had sufficient interest to regulate that contract, even though it
127 See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 125, at 790.
128 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959) (noting that an Illinois mudflap
law might be valid if the state could prove its safety benefits over other states' mudflap laws). See
also S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) ("[I] n the absence of conflicting legislation
by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local
concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some ex-
tent, regulate it.").
29 Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
130 S.C. Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell, 303 U.S 177 (1938) (finding that use of a state highway is pe-
culiarly of local concern; unlike railroads, highways may be owned and operated by the state).
131 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (stating that a mere "incantation of a purpose to promote health
or safety does not insulate a state law from Commerce Clause attack").
132 SeeJames E. Gaylord, Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the Dormant
Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1095, 1117-21 (1999) (discussing the telegraph cases).
133 Id.
134 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 421 (1910).
135 Gaylord, supra note 132, at 1121.
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might affect conduct in other states." 36 By analogy, in Internet auc-
tions, the most likely locale to deem a contract to have been formed,
is in the offeror's state.
Another analogy that may provide appropriate grounds for state
regulations to prevent shill bidding and other types of fraud may
stem from the similarity between online auction sites and highly so-
phisticated mail-order catalogs. 37  Contracts formed under catalog
sale agreements38 are usually regulated under individual state laws;
eBay transactions may be subject to similar laws.13 9 Contractual doc-
trines regarding offer and acceptance of proposed terms remains a
question of state law, regardless of the medium.' 40 Similar questions
resulting from the rise in telecommunication and transportation
technologies have not changed the basic contractual doctrines.
14
Furthermore, state regulation of online auctions need not depend
on the nature of the Internet itself. 42  Online auctions may create
"new legal challenges without any reduction in local stakes.' ' 143  If
buyers and sellers follow an auction site's informational protocols,
auction transactions involve tangible goods and "knowledge of a
physical, geographical shipping destination." Thus, state regulation
might be drafted to only bar transactions emanating or concluding in
the regulated state.' 44 Moreover, state regulation may be justified be-
cause the local interests "are undiminished by the medium shift"
from physical, tangible auction houses to images and character
strokes representing goods for sale from a bedroom, office, ware-
house, etc.'45 Additionally, state legislators exercising their police
powers (health, safety, and welfare) have a compelling interest to
prevent in-state consumers, whether buyer or seller, from being de-
frauded. Therefore, absolute preemption for state laws regulating
136 Id.
137 See Lanin, supra note 118, at 1453-54 (discussing non-data type Internet transactions).
138 See Michael Cooper, Beanie Baby Scams and Identity Thefts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at G19
(finding that eBay's representatives claim that the company "cannot force anyone to follow
through on a bid, other than to tell them that their bid represents a legal contract").
149 See Lanin, supra note 118, at 1454.
140 Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11
HARV.J.L. &TECH. 429, 448-49 (1998) (discussing activities where state interests are unimpaired
by "cybertransition").
141 Id. at 450.
142 See Lanin, supra note 118, at 1454 (discussing Internet transactions that do not involve
data shifts).
14S Salbu, supra note 140, at 448 (discussing activities where state interests are unimpaired by
"cybertransition").
See Lanin, supra note 118, at 1454.
145 Salbu, supra note 140, at 448.
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Internet commerce, including online auctions, may not be legally
sound and, more importantly, may violate our basic notions of feder-
alism. 46
One of the arguments against allowing states to regulate online
auction transactions is that such laws may create costs of compliance
that are "clearly out of proportion to the benefits of permitting de-
centralized regulation. Those disparate costs, however, are allevi-
ated by eBay's automated nature.' 8 Establishing a minimal Congres-
sional mandate from which most states will not deviate will provide
some consistency among states. 4  Additionally, user-provided infor-
mation regarding the state from which the users are transacting re-
duces the burden on eBay1
50
C. Legitimate State Objective
Even if Congress fails to consent to additional consumer protec-
tions against online auction fraud and shill bidding, states should be
able to enact anti-shill bidding laws because such. laws have a legiti-
mate state objective that cannot be served as well by non-
discriminatory means.5 State regulations requiring identity verifica-
tion to prevent shill-bidding (thus preventing in-state buyers from
overpaying for goods) promote an important local concern, while the
impact on interstate commerce is minimal-even if the transaction is
interstate-because the entire market benefits from reduced fraud.'
These protectionist mechanisms require relatively simple software
programs that are already implemented when a seller first applies to
146 Id. at 476.
147 Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 125, at 808.
148 EBay could provide a pop-up screen or hyperlink indicating user rights and obligations
regarding selling or buying within a particular jurisdiction.
149 Due to the nature of the political and law-making processes, it is likely that many states
will use the Congressional mandate as both their floor and ceiling for consumer protections.
However, some states with aggressive consumer protection laws (e.g., New Jersey and Califor-
nia) may wish to supplement the federal law.
150 Users are required to provide information regarding their location (i.e., city, town, etc.)
and state. However, this system will only work if eBay reprograms its registration page to con-
firm that users hail from the jurisdiction they list. Currently, buyers only authenticate their
identity through an e-mail account that has nojurisdiction-specific information tied to it.
1 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (finding that facial discrimination may not be per
se invalid if legitimate local purpose is not served as well by non-discriminatory means).
152 Using secure, encrypted authentication programs, eBay can easily verify each seller or
buyer's locale. Therefore, if a problem arises concerning a purported sale, upon verification
that a problem exists, eBay can (and should be required to) forward the appropriate informa-
tion to local authorities to investigate, rather than relying on an already overburdened FBI or
postal inspectors.
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transact through eBay's online auction house. Furthermore, identity
verification requirements are not protectionist (giving rise to per se
invalidity)153 because identity verification neither gives disparate pref-
erence to one online auction house over another or one state over
another, nor does it diminish competition.
The Commerce Clause is designed to promote competition and
consumer protection; if states enact laws to prevent shill bidding, all
online auction houses will be compelled to change their business
practices to meet other states' new consumer protection standards.
Increased competition will result as consumers are drawn to the
online auction sites whose policies decrease the possibility of fraudu-
lent activity. Most importantly, as shill-bidding decreases, consumers
will pay lower prices for their goods as true competition reenters the
online auction market.
D. Congressional Consent
Any state legislation attempting to regulate online auctions will
likely be attacked, regardless of the states' legitimate regulatory inter-
ests, as violating the dormant Commerce Clause. Nevertheless, it may
be in Congress' best interests, logistically and economically, to explic-
itly consent to some prescribed state regulation.1 4 Such explicit con-
sent to states' regulating how online auctions are conducted between
buyers and/or sellers within their states would be immune from at-
tack under the Commerce Clause. 55
Congressional consent to state regulations must be either "ex-
pressly stated"' 5 6 or "unmistakably clear.' 1 7 Furthermore, the law or
legislative history that a state bases its consent claim upon must show"congressional intent 'to alter the limits of state power otherwise im-
posed by the Commerce Clause.""5
153 See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Cor., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (holding that protectionist laws
are unconstitutional regardless of reasons).
'54 For an explanation of Congressional consent to state regulation, see New York State Dairy
Foods, Inc. v. Northeast Dairy Compact Commission, 198 F.3d 1 (1999) (holding that commission's
pricing regime, with its attendant pooling mechanism and administrative assessments, does not
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause since Congress validly consented).
155 Northeast Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) ("When Congress so
chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under
the Commerce Clause.").
156 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982).
157 S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
158 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341 (1982) (quoting United
States v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 304 (1953)).
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Congressional consent would be the most efficient avenue for all
parties involved. Such consent, allowing a sliding scale for online
auctions, would not only decrease an ever-growing burden on the
federal court system, but also increase the overall resources available
to protect the increasingly popular online auction business by trans-
ferring the burden to the states. Thus, an explicit statement from
Congress indicating that each state may regulate how online auction
buyers and sellers may operate as long as the state's regulations meet
certain minimum provisions (i.e., the floor). States will have every
incentive to protect consumers, from a political and paternalistic
standpoint, and, because states want taxes from commerce, they will
balance regulations above the floor to have their revenue goals meet
their citizens' welfare goals.
VII. FRAUD, FRAUD EVERYWHERE... MAKES ONE STOP AND THINK
The following section of this paper details recent, real-world shill
bidding scandals and eBay's utter disregard for heightened consumer
protections.
A. How to Commit Fraud and Get Away With It (the eBay Guide)
During the Fall of 2002, a consortium of reporters from the Wall
Street Journal, Newsweek, and MSNBC completed extensive research in-
vestigations into the eBay phenomenon and its pitfalls. Highlighting
the prevalence of fraudulent activity, an MSNBC article from Sum-
mer 2002 found that:
Clever scammers now regularly ship reams of paper, or even rocks, to
buyers. That buys the scam artist a few more days before arousing suspi-
cion, and often a FedEx tracking number is enough to convince a buyer
to send the money. Scam artists have also gone to the trouble of creating
fake escrow Web sites and fake shipping sites to assuage skeptical buyers.
And they also hijack accounts that belong to long-time, credible sellers,
and then run their scams on the good name and reputation of that eBay
seller.159
B. Slow or No Reaction to User Complaints
Another recent independent investigation by MSNBC uncovered
conclusive evidence of egregious shill bidding involving eBay transac-
tions that failed to result in any meaningful penalty to the guilty us-
159 Sullivan, supra note 59.
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ers, thereby discrediting eBay's claims that it aggressively fights
fraud.60 Apparently, eBay merely warned the sellers not to do it
again. 61 Ironically, during Summer 2002, Newsweek also produced a
series of articles highlighting the benefits and pitfalls of transacting
business on eBay. According to one article, "eBay managers are still
fanatically attentive to the complaints and desires of their mem-
bers."'63 However, many interviewed members of the eBay trading
community (including those interviewed for the MSNBC investiga-
tion) claim that the company reacts too slowly to address various
complaints, including fraud allegations. 164 For example, in January
2002, eBay learned of a security flaw that made every user's account
vulnerable to hijacking by Internet bandits who could easily change a
user's password as long as the login information was known.6  De-
spite the fact that this security flaw was discovered in January (and re-
ported in the mainstream news during April 2002), eBay did not plan
to fix the problem until that summer, when eBay was to implement a
major, planned security upgrade. In this instance, when major finan-
cial repercussions and credit-history damage could have befallen us-
ers whose accounts were hijacked (by using the accounts for fraudu-
lent sales and purchases), the government should have forced eBay to
either immediately implement a security patch or shut down the site
until a reasonable remedy was available. Under no circumstances
should an inept and negligent eBay have been allowed to remain si-
lent about the problem, only to have users learn that their online
identities were used to perpetrate fraud, with the liability for rebuild-
ing their reputations befallen on the innocent users.
I6O See Brunker, supra note 60 ("[E]ven when presented with solid evidence of wrongdo-
ing ... [eBay] has adopted an especially laissez-faire attitude toward sins by profit-driving
'power sellers."').
161 Id. (discussing that, in light of significant evidence of shill bidding, eBay claimed that it
had "taken appropriate action in accordance with [its] site policies;" however, "the 'appropriate
action' turned out to be a warning to the seller").
162 SeeJerry Adler, The eBay Way of Life, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2002, at 50; Steven Levy, How to
Play the eBay Game; Snipers, bargains, rip-offs and other tricks of the trade, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2002,
at 58; Brad Stone, Meg Gets on the Line; For the CEO, satisfying eBay's tough customers is a full-time job,
NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2002, at 56; Mark Whitaker, Exploring the irresistible allure of online auctions on
eBay, NEWSWEEK, June 17, 2002, at 6.
163 Adler, supra note 162, at 53.
164 Brunker, supra note 60.
165 Brian McWilliams, Security Flaw Opens eBay Accounts to Hijack, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK,
Apr. 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3449930.
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1. Admitted Shill Bidder Still an Active eBay Seller
At the time of writing this article, more than six weeks after
MSNBC published the results of its investigation about a confirmed
and admitted case of shill bidding (costing the ultimate buyer an addi-
tional $531),166 both the seller "brsz-2" and shill "nsports" were still
listed as legitimate users.1 6 ' EBay user "brsz-2," a.k.a. Richard Kohl,
owner of Broadway Rick's Strike Zone, admitted to the MSNBC re-
porter that he bid on his own auction using an account set up "for a
friend." Following this acknowledgement, eBay should have: (1)
permanently suspended his account; (2) reported Kohl to local and
federal law enforcement; and (3) contacted the buyer (and other re-
cent buyers) to inform him of the documented fraud so he could re-
quest a refund.16 Additionally, despite being notified that the seller
"brsz-2" and penultimate bidder "nsports" listed identical contact in-
formation in their respective user profiles, eBay's complaint forums,
Safe Harbor and the Power Seller Trust and Safety team, responded
that there was "not enough evidence to show that a violation [of
eBay's anti-shill bidding policy] had taken place."'69
More disturbing than eBay's failure to punish "brsz-2," is that he is
now capable of hiding behind a "private auction" system where eBay
allows sellers to list items and "hide the identity of bidders and make
it impossible for anyone other than eBay to determine if fraudulent
bidding is occurring."'70 This policy is both highly suspicious and dis-
turbing unless the seller can provide a convincing argument that the
sale of certain goods would cause considerable embarrassment or
harm to the seller. Therefore, because eBay has no incentive to take
any of these reasonable measures, the federal government must act to
166 Brunker, supra note 60.
167 See "Feedback Summary," at http://cgi2.ebay.com/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?MfcISAPI
Command=ViewFeedback&userid=brsz-2 (listing brsz-2's feedback profile) (last visited Apr. 12,
2003); "Feedback Summary," at http://cgi2.ebay.com/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?MfcSAPI
Command=ViewFeedback&userid=nsports (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) (listing nsports's feedback
profile).
1 See U.C.C. § 2-328(4) (1992), supra note 65 (indicating that if shill bidding occurs, the
buyer has the right to avoid the sale or take the goods at the price of the last good-faith bid
prior to the completion of the sale); see also Brunker, supra note 60 (documenting the process
for confirming the fraudulent transaction and describing brsz-2's reasoning for shill bidding).
16 Brunker, supra note 98.
170 See id. ("I Will Never do it Again"); see also "The Bidder has Refused to Complete the Sale,"
at http://webhelp.ebay.com/cgi-bin/eHNC/showdoc-ebay.tcl?docid=2
7 6&queryid=13845861 &
querystring=private (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) (describing a private auction, where the bidding
participants' login information remains hidden).
May 20031
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
protect consumers from eBay's wanton indifference, either by provid-
ing strong federal enforcement or empowering the states to do so.
2. Stamp Forgery Ring
In contrast with the Broadway Rick's swindle, MSNBC also found
powerful evidence of a collectible stamp altering/forgery scam cou-
pled with a shill bidding conspiracy.'7' However, the stamp-scam sell-
ers, "schulyerac" and "chickfrdstk," are no longer listing any goods
for sale. Oddly, neither of these accounts seems to be suspended de-
spite eBay being presented with conclusive evidence of before and af-
ter examples of altered stamps that demonstrate "with 100 percent
certainty" that the stamps presented were altered.7 ' The MSNBC ar-
ticle also claims (without providing evidence) that the accounts of"schulyerac" and "chickfrdstk" were suspended in 1999 in response to
allegations of shill bidding.' Despite this previous punishment,
eBay's spokesperson, Kevin Pursglove, refused to confirm the previ-
ous suspension, nor would he comment on the recent allegations re-
garding stamps being bought, doctored, resold and used to support a
shill bidding conspiracy.
3. Feedback Forum Failures
EBay's refusal to provide information about previously adminis-
tered sanctions for violations of its user policy, where a user has been
justifiably suspended or punished, contradicts the company's ration-
ale for having a Feedback Forum as the primary means for judging
the trustworthiness of a transacting party. Instead of eBay's current
silence on sanctions inquiries, a more appropriate policy would
somehow notify the eBay community about sellers who have been
punished for violating eBay's fraud policies. This is exactly the idea
behind the Feedback Forum-to warn the eBay community if there
are users with whom one should be wary of doing business. An elec-
tronic "scarlet letter" might be most appropriate next to the user's
screen name (and any subsequent modification to that name). Be-
cause the Internet supports efficient, but faceless transactions,
shouldn't consumers be entitled to protection by a system akin to an
171 Id. ("Teamwork Unmasks Alleged Forgeries").
172 Id.
173 Id. ("Accounts Reportedly Suspended").
174 Id.
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Internet Freedom of Information Act, identifying users for previous
fraudulent activities?
4. Authenticating New Accounts and Manipulating Service Lulls
Other types of scams involving new sellers to eBay, initially selling
large quantities of high-priced goods and requesting payment
through wire transfer, should be easy for eBay to discover and regu-
late. 75- If eBay would merely standardize the method of payment op-
tion for any type of electronic transfer of funds (credit, debit, or wire
transfers) and confirm that the account would be reachable by
United States legal authorities if involved in criminal activity, some
problematic auctions would never even get off the ground.
The timing of auctions presents an additional dilemma for honest
users and the eBay Fraud Prevention staff. If a seller starts a two-day
auction on Friday night, purposely anticipating that eBay has fewer
customer service personnel on-site during the weekend, most com-
plaints from users will not be read timely enough to prevent the al-
leged criminal activity.'76
5. Monumental Financial Losses, Not Minor Scams
Instead of considering auction fraud on a case-by-case basis, it may
be time for law enforcement leaders to consider financial losses due
to auction fraud in global terms, including the daunting costs to the
economy and consumer confidence. By late 2001, the median loss
from fraudulent online auctions was approximately $500.' Fur-
thermore, nearly 45% of all fraud complaints last year to the FBI
stemmed from Internet auctions.'7" The statistics on fraud allegations
and prosecutions are depressing and appalling-while the FBI's
Internet task force received nearly 50,000 complaints last year, only
93 resulted in an arrest.'
VIII. THE ECONOMICS OF POLICING INTERNET AUCTION FRAUD
The argument defending limited enforcement is basically the
same regardless of the law enforcement agency, "[1] ocal police see
most Internet fraud as outside their jurisdiction [and] federal au-
175 See Sullivan, supra note 59 ("High-Crime Categories").
176 Id. ("Justice In Their Own Hands").
177 Id.
178 VeriSign Signs Pact with eBay to Fight Fraud on Auction Site, supra note 72.
179 Farnsworth & Knap, supra note 30.
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thorities see most of it as too small to pursue... [while] victims are
losing $500 million per year.""" One of the most persistent com-
plaints is that "[g] overnment agencies and police are stuck with old-
world budgets, geographical jurisdictions and antiquated laws."'.'
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine who is perpetrating various
scams when the nature and policies of many Internet companies, like
eBay, hinder law enforcement efforts by not verifying information
about their active users or taking other reasonable preventive meas-
ures against fraud." Thus, a person who wants to execute fraudulent
transactions over the Internet is overwhelmingly likely to escape any
type of legal penalty by committing a "complex crime below
$100,000" because it is too difficult for the local police and below the
federal government's interest threshold.
The economics of auction fraud support the previously-stated law
enforcement community's reasoning, when viewed from a purely
economic standpoint, post-September 11, 2001. Additional law en-
forcement funding has been earmarked for increased human secu-
rity, not to address consumer fraud. However, this argument also
supports a scenario where the federal government requires the busi-
ness entity, such as eBay, to bear the brunt of whatever increased
costs are involved in making transacting business over the Internet
safer. This is not a problem that merely needs more money spent on
investigations following perpetrated crimes. Instead, resources need
to be devoted to acting proactively to prevent and deter fraud by se-
curely holding reasonable amounts of personal identifiable informa-
tion, to be used in criminal and civil fraud cases. Such a new system
would benefit law enforcement and the court system by providing
easily accessible information resources to assist efficient prosecutions
involving alleged online commercial fraud.
To address the above concerns and shortfalls, a new, powerful
FBI-based Internet crime prevention and enforcement task force
must be created; empowered, and sufficiently funded to adequately
address these problems.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. New FBI Taskforce for Internet Security
In addition to any new federal or state laws, to punish eBay for
knowingly allowing controllable fraud to continue (especially by
guilty Power Sellers and users with sizable complaint files), the fed-
eral government, through the Justice Department and a newly-
empowered FBI Task Force for Internet Security ("TFIS"), must be
prepared to investigate and litigate these allegations against eBay and
its fraudulent users. Following a rigorous investigation of eBay's
fraud prevention policies, the TFIS should recommend reasonable
new anti-fraud safeguards, and announce significant financial sanc-
tions (e.g., $1,000,000 per month) if eBay cannot meet an initial-
(e.g., six months) and long-term timetable for significant fraud-
reduction. For the government to propose minimum standards (or,
in the alternative, hefty fines) is not a novel idea, as other high-profile
businesses maintain government-mandated regulatory programs
(e.g., the banking, financial services, and insurance industries).
B. New Procedures
The new fraud reduction services should include consumer pro-
tections paralleling the following proposals: (1) the ability to file a
fraud complaint with eBay within twenty four hours of discovering
the problem; (2) the ability to speak with a live eBay investigator to
discuss a fraud complaint within three days of filing said complaint;
(3) required suspensions of any user account that has amassed (x) %
of negative feedback within a set period of time; (4) automatic freez-
ing of a user's corresponding PayPal account until fraud related is-
sues are resolved (and, possibly, automatic notice to local law en-
forcement); and (5) requiring substantive information gathered by
eBay's internal fraud investigation team to be provided to any com-
plaining user who wishes to file a civil action."'
Additionally, the Justice Department should require eBay to sign a
consent decree that more (a number to be determined as reason-
able) customer service personnel will be available daily (including
weekends) to address consumer complaints. If eBay's customer ser-
vice department cannot address the situation within forty eight hours,
184 A Congressional amendment to the FCRA may be necessary to implement this plan.
However, disclosure of sensitive information is a reasonable disclosure once a complaining user
has filed a complaint in state or federal court.
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an eBay-mandated auction injunction might be reasonable against
the accused party.
Other users and potential economic transacting partners should
also be warned of those who have knowingly committed fraud.
Therefore, upon a finding by the TFIS that an individual or business
committed online fraud, mandatory notice should attach to that
user's Feedback Profile (an e-commerce Scarlet Letter) and all the
credit reporting agencies should be notified. This is a reasonable re-
sponse to address and deter all e-commerce fraud.
C. Reporting Requirements
Under a new regulatory regime, eBay should also be required to
report quarterly (for the next five years) to the TFIS and the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") that the new fraud-reducing methods are
achieving significant reductions-not just for confirmed cases, but for
all types of fraud. State and local governments would participate in
this new regime by providing information into a centrally located da-
tabase of reported online auction fraud. Additionally, monthly re-
ports to the TFIS should be required, providing specific details of the
allegations, user contact information, and any questionable feedback
profile info. EBay could set up an automated database system to ag-
gregate this information as it comes into the customer service de-
partment. The TFIS could then work with local law enforcement to
share resources and responsibility. A monthly estimate of reported
and suspected fraud, in aggregate dollar amounts, should also be re-
quired.
Following a TFIS recommendation, the Justice Department (or a
corresponding state agency, if so empowered) should be required to
file a lawsuit (or, with a promise of financial assistance, encourage lo-
cal law enforcement to do so) against parties engaged in or facilitat-
ing fraud, including eBay itself. While these prosecutions may sig-
nificantly increase the budget for Justice Department (or state)
lawyers and court resources, public policy demands that such wide-
spread fraud be vigorously attacked to protect the economy and con-
sumer confidence. For a persuasive example of how the capital mar-
kets react to widespread corporate fraud, one must merely look to the
events surrounding the Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Adelphia ac-
counting scandals.
These new reporting requirements should not be overwhelming
for the TFIS, the Justice Department, or local law enforcement.
[Vol. 5:4
ANOTHER PHANTOM MENACE
Some kind of nominal use-tax could be assessed on eBay55 transac-
tions (they would figure out how to pass the cost along to consumers
anyway) to pay for law enforcement review.1 86 Under this new regime,
law enforcement could randomly choose who to pressure or prose-
cute and then notify the local and national news to try to deter oth-
ers.
If eBay fails to implement these types of measures, or the federal
government does not mandate remedies with significant conse-
quences, more users may resort to vigilanteism because no one else is
willing to help them. 87 Angry defrauded users may start businesses
designed like the A-Team, tracking down and putting pressure on
fraudulent sellers.
D. Protecting Privacy
Included in any new governmentally-mandated information shar-
ing system should be tools to protect an eBay user's privacy. This
should not be a problem because the truly sensitive information,
credit card information and history, would remain on a secure eBay
server (or with a trusted outside provider like VeriSign), only avail-
able to law enforcement. Moreover, any eBay user can already re-
quest the given contact information (address and phone number) for
another user it wants to contact, as long as the two parties have en-
gaged in a transaction. 18  The ability for users to contact each other
at verified addresses (or provide this information to law enforcement)
certainly provides greater security than the current system where de-
frauding parties disappear without any consequences. Therefore, us-
ers would not have a very persuasive invasion-of-privacy complaint re-
garding the new requirements for allowing automatic updates from
credit reporting agencies for confirmable residential addresses and
phone numbers.
Additionally, the new information verification system could also
be used to cross-reference users' backgrounds to make sure they are
not participating on eBay as more than one entity. Furthermore,
those users who have not been at a confirmed address for a set period
185 This proposed tax could apply to eBay and other online marketplaces with similar busi-
ness models.
186 Unfortunately, someone has to bear the cost of new security measures, and, despite my
earlier proposals, I doubt eBay's bean counters are willing to absorb it.
187 Key the opening theme to "The A-Team" (reformulated as "The E-Team"): "If you have a
problem, if [eBay won't] help, and if you can find them, maybe you can hire ... the [E]-Team."
188 "Find Members," at http://cgi3.ebay.com/aw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?MemberSearchShow
(last visited Apr. 12, 2003) ("Contact Info").
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of time, or have little credit history, might be required to provide
some kind of additional information for greater security.
Finally, public policy demands that economics should only play a
small part in deciding how vigorously to combat fraud. The only rea-
son that a marketplace like "eBay Motors"'9 is doing so well is that
consumers feel like they are provided with adequate security. All
eBay users deserve the same relative protections.
I do not propose establishing a regulatory regime that would crip-
ple eBay's finances, but it is also not equitable to allow a large set of
eBay users to bear the financial cost of being defrauded when there
are some relatively simple and inexpensive tools to combat and deter
many of the fraudulent activities currently perpetrated. Similar to
the current drug war (attacking drug proliferation on both the single-
dealer level and its more complex organizational structure), a TFIS-
type system and eBay's internal fraud reduction team need to start
thinking like criminals so they can react with novel solutions to re-
duce online auction fraud, which in the aggregate costs U.S. consum-
ers approximately $500,000,000 per year.
CONCLUSION
As the prevalence and cost of Internet auction fraud rises, public
policy demands that the government react to the economic and so-
cietal dangers resulting from eBay's failure to devote additional re-
sources to identifying and punishing swindlers. Currently, eBay has
every incentive to maintain the status quo of limited fraud prevention
tools-every recent fiscal quarter has delivered rising profits and an
increased user-base. Therefore, without external intervention by the
government or lawsuits filed by consumer advocacy groups (or indi-
viduals), eBay will not be incentivized to further reduce fraud.
EBay has an amazing business model and control over the Inter-
net auction market. Furthermore, despite the current dot.com-
related economic downturn, eBay will continue to thrive as more
merchants look to transact business through its portal. But, as Uncle
Ben told Peter Parker in Spiderman, "with great power comes great re-
sponsibility."' 1"
EBay controls virtually the entire online auction marketplace.
However, eBay has abdicated its responsibility to consumers as a ser-
vice provider, marketplace purveyor, and trade facilitator. Despite
189 http://pages.ebay.com/ebaymotors/ (last visited April 14, 2003).
190 As long as they are not foolish enough to pay for goods with cash or check.
191 SPIDERMAN (Columbia Pictures 2002).
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troves of legitimate complaints and conclusive evidence of fraud,
eBay has failed to employ new human and technological tools to pro-
actively cut down on fraud, timely address users' notification and
complaints related to fraudulent activity, and notify users when ques-
tionable actions by others threaten the validity of a pending or con-
summated sale. Apparently, the economic costs of providing more
blanket safety to the majority of eBay's users are driving eBay's laissez-
faire policies. 192
Online auctions are an exciting and efficient way to sell and pur-
chase goods, but as this article has detailed, more regulation is
needed because the sites' self-regulation has failed miserably and led
to a system where the only sure winners are stockholders and crimi-
nals, not consumers.
Buying and selling goods over the Internet is only revolutionary
because of the ease and speed of the interactivity between buyers and
many non-traditional merchants. In reality, eBay is merely providing
software for users to run auctions directly from their computers.
Thus, there should be no reason why state authorities should be pre-
cluded from protecting users from fraud. Since a valid contract is
formed upon the closing of the auction by the seller and winning
bidder, state contract law should predominate over the more nebu-
lous concept of what constitutes a defrauded auction participant's
remedies and whether Internet commerce is- purely a state concern
versus a federally-governed activity.
Applying the long-established balancing test for determining
whether Internet auctions may be regulated by the states, state Inter-
net auction regulation embraces the dormant Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence because it: (1) regulates evenhandedly with only inciden-
tal affects on interstate commerce; (2) while evenhandedly regulating
interstate commerce probably does not place an excessive burden on
interstate commerce because eBay can easily automate and notify us-
ers of their rights and obligations based on sign-up information; and
192 For an example of how one lucrative market-auto sales-provides economic incentives
for eBay to provide consumers with greater confidence and security, see Jeanne Wright, Your
Wheels You Can't Kick Tires Online, but Hassles Can Be Avoided, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at GI
(discussing security services (complementary and for a nominal fee) available to consumers
purchasing motor vehicles through eBay Motors). See also eBay Motors, at http://pages.ebay
.com/ebaymotors/ (last visited April 14, 2003); eBay Motors Services at http://pages.ebay.com
/ebaymotors/services/overview.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) (listing eBay's free and fee-
based buyer assurance services). Every month, more than 7,000,000 users access eBay Motors,
with the company expecting sales of $2,500,000,000 for 2002. Free limited warranty (one
month or 1000 miles) protects against powertrain problems. Free purchase insurance, with
coverage up to $20,000 (and $500 deductible), protects against fraud or material misrepresen-
tation. On-site motor vehicle inspection costs $99.99.
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(3) the states' interests in regulating against shill bidding clearly out-
weighs the burden on interstate commerce."'
Finally, if Internet auction regulation fails to withstand a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge, it would be in Congress' best interest to
explicitly consent to state regulations because of the growing local
problems arising from fraud and the limited resources of the federal
government to prevent and prosecute such crimes.
193 See Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (discussing the criteria
for withstanding a dormant Commerce Clause attack).
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